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Two experiments investigate the scope of imitation by testing whether 36-month-olds
can learn to produce a categorization strategy through observation. After witnessing
an adult sort a set of objects by a visible property (their color, Experiment 1) or a
non-visible property (the particular sounds produced when the objects were shaken,
Experiment 2), children showed significantly more sorting by those dimensions
relative to children in control groups, including a control in which children saw the
sorted endstate but not the intentional sorting demonstration. The results show that
36-month-olds can do more than imitate the literal behaviors they see; they also
abstract and imitate rules that they see another person use.

Imitation is an early developing ability that
allows children to acquire skills and behaviors
from other people in their culture. Aspects of
imitation may be specific to humans; indeed,
imitation has been implicated in the development
of complex social-cognitive processes such as
theory of mind (e.g. Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993;
Meltzoff, 2007), and has been proposed as a
fundamental mechanism for transmitting culture
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from one generation to the next (e.g., Boyd &
Richerson, 1996; Meltzoff, Kuhl, Movellan, &
Sejnowski, in press; Tomasello, 1999). In order to
understand how imitation contributes to these
achievements, an important question concerns the
type of information that can be imitated.
The overarching goal of this paper is to extend
the typical studies of imitation, which have largely
examined imitation of concrete actions (means)
and outcomes (ends). We test imitation at a more
abstract level—whether children can learn a
cognitive strategy or rule from observing another’s
behaviors. We test whether watching an adult sort
several objects along a particular dimension (e.g.,
their non-obvious sound-making properties) will
lead children to sort objects along the same
dimension.
Past research has established that children can
quickly and efficiently learn to perform simple
behaviors from watching others. This includes
imitating the physical outcomes that people
produce using objects. Experiments with infants
and toddlers show imitation of a wide range of
outcomes, including opening containers, activating
lights or sounds, and using simple tools (e.g.
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Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002; Meltzoff,
1988, 2007; Nielsen, 2006; Want & Harris, 2001).
Toddlers can also infer what the intended outcome
of a model’s behavior is even if they do not see the
model achieve the goal. In an experiment by
Meltzoff (1995), 18-month-olds saw an adult
attempt to complete a variety of tasks, but they
never saw him succeed. When given their turn at
solving the problem, the children demonstrated
their understanding of the model’s underlying
goals or intentions by performing the act that
would achieve the inferred goal rather than
replicating the same unsuccessful actions used by
the adult.
Children can also copy the exact means or
literal actions that others use (e.g. Barr, Dowden,
& Hayne, 1996; Bauer, 1992; Flynn & Whiten,
2008; Meltzoff, 1988; Nagell, Olguin, &
Tomasello, 1993; Nielsen, 2006; Tennie, Call, &
Tomasello, 2006). In one experiment, a group of
14-month-olds saw an adult act in distinct and
novel ways on objects to produce outcomes. For
example, an adult bent and touched a light panel
with his head and the light turned on (Meltzoff,
1988). When given the object for the first time
after a week delay, 67% of the children produced
this novel act. In contrast, none of the children in a
control group who saw the adult manipulate the
object but not produce the target act did so.
Children are highly attuned to the specific actions
others produce, and there are circumstances in
which they over-imitate, i.e. to reproduce actions
that are unnecessary or even counterproductive for
completing an outcome (Horner & Whiten, 2005;
Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Whiten,
Flynn & Horner, 2007; Whiten, Custance, Gomez,
Teixidor, & Bard, 1996).
A growing body of research is focused on the
conditions that govern imitation, with findings
showing that children’s imitation is regulated by
the overall goal of the demonstration and their
understanding of how purposeful, effective, and
contextually appropriate the acts are (Bekkering,
Wöhlschlager, & Gattis, 2000; Brugger, Lariviere,
Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007; Carpenter, Akhtar, &
Tomasello, 1998; Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello,
2005; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; Flynn, 2008;
Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Gleissner,
Bekkering, & Meltzoff, 2000; Nielsen, 2006;
Repacholi & Meltzoff, 2007; Want & Harris,

2001; Williamson & Markman, 2006; Williamson,
Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008).
In adults, another important part of imitation is
duplicating the strategy, organization, or rules that
another person uses when tackling a task. For
example, a graduate student may attend a scientific
talk by an experienced speaker and use that talk as
a guide or template when constructing one they
later give themselves. The student would not copy
the exact words or content from the model’s
presentation, but they might decide to apply the
model’s organizational structure. This type of
social learning is not tied to concrete outcomes of
manipulating an object, as is the case, for example,
when learning about a tool’s function (e.g. Casler
& Kelemen, 2005, 2007). Instead, this scenario
involves learning an abstract cognitive strategy
that could be applied across a very broad set of
situations and used when faced with a new
problem. Rule imitation adds an important
component to investigations of how cultural
knowledge is transmitted and influences individual
behavior (e.g., Smith, Kalish, Griffiths, &
Lewandowsky, 2008).
There is evidence that children and other
primates can imitate the organization of a series of
behaviors (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Subiaul,
Cantlon, Holloway, & Terrace, 2004; Subiaul,
Lurie, Romansky, Klein, Holmes & Terrace, 2007;
Subiaul, Romansky, Cantlon, Klein & Terrace,
2007; Whiten, Flynn, Brown, & Lee, 2006). For
example, children are more likely to remember
and reproduce the actions in a series that are
necessary (versus unnecessary) for producing
meaningful outcomes (e.g. Barr & Hayne, 1996;
Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Mandler, 1989). Young
children have also been shown to imitate another’s
action organization in a different way (Flynn &
Whiten, 2008; Whiten et al., 2006). In Flynn and
Whiten’s experiment, for example, 3- and 5-yearolds saw a model open a locked puzzle box either
by first assembling and then manipulating each of
a number of keys, or assembling and manipulating
each of the keys in turn. Even though both
approaches would yield the same outcome of
unlocking the box, the children were more likely
to use the approach they saw demonstrated (even
with a novel key) rather than the other approach.
Further, Subiaul and colleagues (2004, 2007a,
2007b) investigated whether rhesus macaque
monkeys, typically developing children, and
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individuals with autism can imitate an arbitrary
sequence of actions (pressing pictures in a
particular order) (Subiaul et al., 2004; Subiaul,
Lurie, et al., 2007; Subiaul, Romansky, et al.,
2007). In this work, several pictures appear
simultaneously on a touch-screen. When the
pictures are touched in a specific sequence (e.g., A
 B  C  D), monkeys receive a reward of a
food pellet and humans see an entertaining video
clip. When a mistake is made (e.g., A  D), the
trial ends and no reinforcement is provided. The
spatial configuration of the pictures on the touchscreen changes on each trial, so that the sequence
of pictures, rather than specific motor movements,
must be learned. Participants in these studies
watched a model activate the correct sequence of
pictures to obtain a reward. Later, the participants
were given the opportunity to play the game
themselves. Two-, 3-, and 4-year-olds who
watched the model were faster to implement the
observed sequence than those who had not seen
the demonstration.
We here investigate a different kind of abstract
imitation in young children, the ability of 36month-olds to extract a categorization rule from
observing the behavior of a model. We tested
whether children who watch an adult intentionally
sort a group of objects into two categories along a
particular dimension (e.g., the invisible soundmaking properties of the object) would later sort
along that dimension themselves. To correctly
reproduce a sorting strategy, children would have
to identify the dimension the model was using for
categorizing and then re-enact it in their own
sorting behavior. Such behavior would be
particularly striking if the dimension used by the
adult was different from the one the children
spontaneously use.
Sorting strategies are an interesting case
because the relevant groupings can be applied
across many materials and situations and can lead
to further learning. For example, grouping
strawberries by color in order to predict their
ripeness and flavor could also be applied to other
types of fruit across seasons; and grouping objects
by their invisible properties (such as sound) is an
important principle for establishing natural kinds
in biology and other sciences. If 3-year-olds can
acquire such categorization strategies by watching
others employ them, it suggests a powerful, non-
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verbal mechanism by which generalizable rules or
strategies can be learned.
In Experiment 1, we examined whether 36month-old children would sort a series of objects
by color rather than by shape after watching a
model demonstrate a color sorting strategy. In
Experiment 2, we investigated whether children
would sort objects by a non-obvious dimension
(the sound each object made) after watching a
model demonstrate that sorting strategy. Several
alternative mechanisms, such as stimulus
enhancement or the matching of endstates
(sometimes called emulation, e.g. Want & Harris,
2002), could lead to increased sorting along a
particular dimension. To rule out these lowerorder explanations we also included relevant
control groups, thus isolating the importance of
observing a model’s intentional sorting behavior.
EXPERIMENT 1: VISIBLE PROPERTIES
Past research has shown that young children
preferentially sort by shape (e.g. Brian &
Goodenough, 1929; Kagan & Lemkin, 1961;
Melkman, Koriat, & Pardo, 1976; Suchman &
Trabasso, 1966). Experiment 1 tests whether
children who see an adult intentionally sort an
array of objects (containing two shapes and two
colors) into two groups based on their color would
subsequently adopt the same sorting strategy. For
example, one set of eight objects included two
black and two white hats and two black and two
white spoons. Children could choose to group the
objects by color, by shape, or to place them
randomly. To assess the importance of the
intentional demonstration, we also measured the
sorting behaviors of children in three control
groups. The Baseline group established children’s
rate of color sorting when the adult did not act on
the objects. The Presort group addressed the
possibility that seeing the outcome of the sorting
demonstration—namely, the objects sorted by
color—would lead children to sort by color.
Finally, the Presort + Manipulation group was
included to control for the possibility that
increased attention to the objects-in-categories (as
opposed to witnessing the adult’s sorting behavior)
might lead children to sort by color. If children,
like adults, can learn a rule from another person’s
intentional intervention, they should be more
likely to sort the objects by color after witnessing
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that sorting behavior than are children in the
control groups
Method
Participants. Eighty 36-month-old children
(40 males), whose ages ranged from 2;11 to 3;1
(years; months), were recruited through the
University of Washington’s participant list. The
racial/ethnic composition of the sample was 86%
white, 1% Asian, 8% mixed race, and 5%
other/unknown, with 4% self-reporting as being of
Hispanic
ethnicity.
Direct
measures
of
socioeconomic status were not obtained, but the
sample was generally middle- to upper-middle
class according to previous studies using the same
participant pool. Four additional children’s data
were excluded due to experimenter error.
Materials. We used two sets of eight objects,
each containing equal numbers of objects of two
shapes and two colors. One set consisted of two
white and two black hats (5.5 x 5 x 2 cm) and two
white and two black spoons (10.5 x 2.5 x 1cm).
The second set included two green and two pink
dice (2.5 x 2.5 x 2.5 cm) and two green and two
pink crayon-erasers (7 cm x 1.5 cm diameter). The
objects were sorted into a two-bowled tray (23.5 x
5 x 4.5 cm), hereafter referred to as “bowls,”
(Figure 1, left panel).
Procedure. Children were tested individually
in a university laboratory room and their behavior
was digitally recorded for subsequent analysis.
Each child was randomly assigned to one of four
independent groups, each consisting of a
demonstration phase and a response period.

Demonstration Phase.
Sorting. The experimenter placed one of the
sets of eight objects in a randomly intermixed heap
on the table (within approximately a circle of 10
cm radius). The bowls were placed on the table
slightly beyond the heap from the children. The
experimenter drew the children’s attention (e.g.
“It’s my turn first”), and then, one at a time,
picked up and placed each object of one color into
one bowl, and then placed each of the objects of
the other color into the other bowl.
Baseline control. Children in this control
group saw no demonstration; the session began
with the response period described below. This
provided a baseline assessment of the degree to
which children spontaneously sorted by shape or
color without observing a demonstration.
Presort control. The experimenter presented
children with the eight objects from a particular
set, as in the Sorting group. However, the objects
were presented inside the bowls, already sorted by
color (e.g., the green dice and crayons in one
bowl; the pink dice and crayons in the other). The
experimenter drew the children’s attention to the
objects by moving her hand in front of the bowls
and saying, for example, “See, we are going to
play with these.” This condition controlled for the
possibility that children would sort the objects into
two groups based merely on seeing the outcome of
the sorting process – the two-category
configuration.
Presort + Manipulation control. As in the
previous control group, the experimenter in this
condition presented children with the eight objects
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already sorted in the two bowls by color.
However, this control group was even more
rigorous inasmuch as the experimenter also
manipulated the objects. She explained, “It’s my
turn first,” and proceeded to lift and return each
object one at a time from the bowl on the child’s
right, and then did the same for each object in the
left-hand bowl. This controls for the possibility
that children will sort the objects into groups based
on seeing the endstate configuration plus a person
actively handling the objects in each of the bowls.
Response Period. The response period for all
groups was identical. The experimenter placed the
objects in a mixed pile on the table in front of the
children (either emptying them out of the bowls in
the Sorting, Presort control, and Presort +
Manipulation control groups, or simply placing
them there in the case of the Baseline control
group). The bowls were placed slightly farther
back on the table, but still within reaching distance
for the children. The children were then given the
opportunity to place all of the objects into the
bowls (e.g., “Now it’s your turn to play with
these.”). If they did not sort the objects into the
bowls exhaustively by color (all four of one color
in one bowl and all four of the other color in the
other bowl), they were given a second opportunity
to do so. In this case, the experimenter removed all
of the objects from the bowls, placed the eight
objects into a mixed pile on the table, offered a
second, neutral prompt (“You can have another
turn”), and gave the child the opportunity to place
the objects into the bowls. The objects of Set A
were then removed.
Next, children were given a second set of
objects (Set B) to test generalization. These eight
objects were placed in a mixed pile on the table.
No demonstration was shown. This provided a test
of whether children in the Sorting group would
transfer the color sorting strategy from one array
of objects to a novel set. As with Set A, the
children were given up to two opportunities to
place the objects of Set B into the bowls by color.
The order in which the set of objects was
presented was counterbalanced across the
experimental groups, as was the color placed in
the left or right bowl during the demonstration
phase.
Dependent Measures and Scoring. Research
assistants, blind to the experimental group, scored
the children’s sorting behaviors from video. In
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order to be credited with a sort, the child had to
place all four objects of one dimension (shape or
color) into one bowl and all of the other objects
into the opposite bowl. The scorers recorded
whether children reached this criterion, and if so,
by which dimension (shape or color). Two
dependent
measures
were
calculated,
a
preferential-sort score and a color-sort score.
Preferential-sort score. Children were given
up to two chances to place the objects of Set A and
up to two chances to place the objects of Set B
into the bowls. The preferential-sort score
measures whether a child’s first sort of the objects
was by shape or color. If the child’s first sort for a
set of objects was by color, it was scored as +1; if
it was by shape, it was scored as -1. If the child
failed to sort a set of objects by color or shape he
received a score of 0. The scores from each of the
two sets of objects were then summed, resulting in
a score that ranged from -2 (two shape sorts) to +2
(two color sorts) for each child.
Color-sort score. The color-sort score is a
measure of whether the children ever sorted a set
of objects according to color. For each set, the
scorer made a yes/no judgment of whether the
child placed all of the objects of one color in one
bowl and all of the objects of the other color in the
second bowl, either on the first or second attempt
(when given) with each set of objects. Each “yes”
judgment was scored as a 1 and each “no” as a 0,
resulting in a score for each participant ranging
from 0 (neither set sorted by color) to 2 (both sets
sorted by color).
Scoring agreement was assessed by re-coding
a randomly-chosen 25% of the data by a scorer
who was blind to the experimental group and to
the hypotheses of the study. The agreement was
100%.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses of the preferential-sort
scores show that children readily sorted the objects
during the response period according to either the
color or shape dimension: 71 of the 80 children
(89%) sorted at least one of the sets of objects
either by color or by shape. The mean number of
sets sorted (out of 2) ranged between 1.40 - 1.50
(SD = .68 -.76) for all four experimental groups,
with no significant difference among groups, F (3,
76) = .10, p = .96, hp2 = .00. Thus, children were
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equally likely to sort the objects along one of the
two dimensions regardless of group.
Even though the children in all groups were
equally likely to engage in a sorting behavior,
Figure 2 shows that the particular dimension on
which they sorted varied as a function of
experimental group. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) of the preferential-sort scores
showed that children in the Sorting group were
more likely to sort by color on their first sort (M =
.90, SD = 1.1) than were children in each of the
three control groups (Baseline M = -.50, SD = 1.0;
Presort M = -.30, SD = 1.4; Presort + Manipulation
M = 0, SD = 1.4), F (3, 76) = 4.97, p = .003, hp2 =
.16. Follow-up comparisons using the StudentNewman-Keuls (SNK) method showed that
children in the Sorting group were significantly (p
< .05) more likely to sort by color than were
children in each of the controls, and that the
control groups did not significantly differ from
one another. Additionally, only in the Sorting
group was the mean preferential-sort score
significantly above 0, t(19) = 3.60, p = .002,
Cohen’s d = .80, indicating that only after
observing the model sort by color were the
children more likely to initially sort objects by
color than by shape. In contrast, the initial sorts of
the children in the Baseline control group were
significantly below 0, indicating that their first
sorts were more likely to be by shape than by
color, t(19) = 2.24, p = .04, Cohen’s d = .50. The
first sorts of the other two control groups (Presort
and Presort + Manipulation controls) were at
chance levels.

The distribution of the raw preferential-sort
scores documents the strength of this effect. As
shown in Table 1, 65% of the children (13 of 20)
in the Sorting group had scores of +1 or +2,
indicating preferential sorting by color rather than
by shape. In contrast, only 25% of the children (15
of 60) across all of the control groups combined
had scores of +1 or +2, p < .01 Fisher’s exact test,
Cramer’s V = .36.

This pattern of results is the same when
considering the color-sort scores. As shown in
Figure 3, and as confirmed by a one-way
ANOVA, children in the Sorting group were more
likely to sort by color at some point (M = 1.30, SD
= .86) than were children in the control groups
(Baseline M = .65, SD = .67; Presort M = .70, SD
= .73; Presort + Manipulation M = .80, SD = .83),
F (3,76) = 2.93, p = .04, hp2 = .10. The follow-up
SNK test showed that the Sorting group was
significantly more likely to sort by color than the
controls and that there was no significant
difference between the control groups. The
distribution of color-sort scores is shown in Table
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a function of test group when using Set B as they
were when using Set A. Further, a specific
examination of the color-sort score of Set B shows
that the children in the Sorting group (M = .60, SD
= .50) had a significantly higher score than did the
children in the combined control groups (M = .32,
SD = .47), t(76) = 2.30, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .58.
The children in the Sorting group thus transferred
the color sorting strategy to the objects of Set B
even though this strategy was only demonstrated
for the objects of Set A, showing generalization.
2. In the Sorting group, 55% of the children (11 of
20) sorted both sets of objects by color during
their interaction with them, whereas only 17% (10
of 60) did so in the controls, p < .001, Fisher’s
exact test, Cramer’s V = .38.
These data show that the spontaneous rate of
sorting by color was low in the control groups. In
fact, children in the Baseline control group had a
spontaneous preference to sort by shape, which is
consistent with previous literature. Moreover, the
control groups demonstrate that children did not
sort by color after seeing the objects presorted by
color (Presort control) or after the model drew
attention to the sorted objects and handled them in
their respective bowls (Presort + Manipulation
control). The uniquely high level of color sorting
in the Sorting group suggests that witnessing the
model’s sorting behavior led the children to sort
by color.
Recall that children in the Sorting group saw
the adult sort the eight objects in Set A, but they
did not see her sort the eight objects in Set B. The
objects of Set B were simply put in a heap on the
table and the children allowed to play with them
thus providing an opportunity to test whether they
would generalize a color-sorting strategy. A 2-way
mixed model ANOVA on the color-sort scores
showed no main effect difference between the
scores on Set A (M = .48, SD = .50) and Set B (M
= .39, SD = .49), F (1, 76) = 1.80, p = .18, hp2 =
.02. There was a significant main effect for Test
Group, as expected, and no significant Set(2) x
Test Group(4) interaction (the values for Set A and
B respectively are: Sorting M = .70, SD = .47, M =
.60, SD = .50; Baseline M = .30, SD = .47, M =
.35, SD = .49; Presort M = .45, SD = .51, M = .25,
SD = .44; Presort + Manipulation M = .45, SD =
.51, M = .35, SD = .48), F (3, 76) = .627, p = .60,
hp2 = .02. This indicates that children were as
likely to discriminately sort the objects by color as

EXPERIMENT 2: INVISIBLE PROPERTY
Experiment 2 investigated whether children
would adopt a strategy that involved sorting along
an invisible dimension—namely, the sound the
objects made when they were shaken. Children in
the Sorting group watched as a model sorted four
identical-looking objects into two categories based
on the sound that each one made when the
Experimenter shook them (e.g., either a jingle or a
rattle). As in Experiment 1, we gave the children
an opportunity to interact with that set of objects
as well as with a second set. Since the objects in a
given set were identical in appearance, the
children could either sort by the invisible property
(that could only be revealed by first shaking the
objects to reveal the sound) or they could group
them randomly. Because pilot testing showed that
sorting by sound was a difficult task for 36-montholds, we reduced the number of objects to four
(two of each kind). Based on the results of
Experiment 1, we predicted that the children
would be more likely to sort the objects by sound
in the Sorting group versus the control groups.
Method
Participants.
Forty-eight
36-month-olds
(range: 2;11-3;1 years; 24 males) were recruited
through a University’s participant list. The racial
make-up of this sample was 87% white, 2% Asian,
4% mixed race, and 8% unknown, with 4%
additionally reporting Hispanic ethnicity. Three
additional children’s data were excluded due to
experimenter error (1) and noise during the testing
session (2). None of the children had participated
in Experiment 1.
Materials. This procedure used two sets of
four objects each. The appearance of the objects in

8

IMITATION OF RULES

each set was identical. Unbeknownst to the child,
the objects were hollow and filled with different
sound-making material. One set of four objects
consisted of four small, white hats (5.5 x 5 x 2
cm). We inserted a rattle made of a few grains of
hard rice kernels into two of them and inserted a
small jingle bell into the other two. The weights of
the objects were indistinguishable to an untrained
adult—each filler weighing fractions of an ounce.
An informal sample of untrained adults reported
that the jingle and rattle sounds were readily
distinguishable. The other set of four object
consisted of four yellow ducks (5.5 x 4.5 x 5 cm),
two of which contained coins and two of which
contained packets of salt. Again, the soundmaking properties were readily discriminable but
the weight was indistinguishable.
Procedure. Each child was randomly assigned
to one of three independent groups: Sorting,
Sound-Only, or Presort + Manipulation. (The
Presort control group used in Experiment 1 could
not be conducted because the experimenter had to
handle the objects in order for children to hear that
they made distinct sounds.) Each condition
consisted of a demonstration phase and a response
period.
Demonstration Phase.
Sorting. The experimenter placed the four
objects of Set A in a square arrangement
(approximately 12 x 12 cm) on the table in front of
the children, see Figure 1B (right half). Although
the children did not know it, the two objects that
made one kind of sound (e.g. the two hats
containing rice) were on their right side and the
two objects that made the other sound were on
their left. The two bowls were placed on the table
slightly farther away from the children than the
objects. The adult drew the children’s attention
(e.g. “It’s my turn first”) and proceeded to sort the
objects into the bowls according to the sound they
made when shaken. The experimenter always
started with the same object (the one on the right
of the square that was closest to the child). She
picked it up, shook it, and listened intently, and
then placed it into the bowl on the child’s right.
She then picked up and shook the second object,
which made the same sound, and placed it into the
right bowl. Finally, she shook each of the other
objects, one at a time, while listening intently to
each, and placed them into the left bowl.

Sound-Only control. The procedure for this
control group was virtually identical to the Sorting
group, except that there was no sorting. The
experimenter brought out Set A, placed the four
objects in a square on the table, and drew the
children’s attention to them (e.g. “It’s my turn
first.”). The experimenter then shook each of the
objects in the same order described for the Sorting
group. Instead of sorting the objects into the
bowls, the experimenter simply returned the
objects to the same place on the table. This
provided a measure of spontaneous (baseline)
sorting behavior based on witnessing the adult
shaking the objects and producing two different
sounds.
Presort + Manipulation control. In this
control group, children saw the final endstate of
the sorting behavior, but not the intentional sorting
by the adult. The experimenter brought out the
objects of Set A, presorted in the bowls (the two
objects with one sound property were in the right
bowl and the two with the other sound property
were in the left bowl). The adult then drew the
children’s attention to them (e.g. “It’s my turn
first.”) and picked up and shook each of the
objects in the right bowl, one at a time, putting
them back in their bowl. She then repeated this
shaking and sound making with the objects in the
left bowl. This group was highly matched to the
Sorting group: The children saw the adult shake
the objects, heard that two of the objects produced
one kind of sound and two produced another kind
of sound, and saw the adult put the objects in the
bowls according to the sound properties. The
experimental question is whether this was
sufficient for children to subsequently sort by the
property of sound, or whether they had to witness
the adult’s active sorting behavior.
Response Period. For all groups, the
experimenter then placed the objects of Set A in a
square arrangement on the table in front of the
children (see Fig. 1B). Although the children did
not know it, the individual objects were placed in a
different orientation during the response period
than they had been during the demonstration. The
two objects that made the first type of sound were
placed at the front of the square (in the row closest
to the children) and the two objects that made the
other sound were placed in the back row. This
prevented children from achieving the correct
categorization through an imitation strategy of
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copying a remembered sequence of motor
behaviors by the Experimenter. The bowl was
placed behind the objects, but still within reaching
distance for the children.
The children were then given an opportunity
to place the objects into the bowls (e.g., “Now it’s
your turn to play with these”). Once the children
had placed all of the objects into the bowls, the
experimenter removed them from the table and,
out of view of the child, put them aside so that the
child’s sorting could be scored later. (A second
group of Set-A objects was used because it was
not always possible to code from the video
whether the children had sorted the identicalappearing objects by sounds. At the end of the
session, the experimenter retrieved the bowls and
determined whether the objects had been sorted by
sound. This procedure allowed us to obtain two
trials worth of data with identical arrays.) The
identical group of Set-A objects was brought out
and placed on the table in the same square
arrangement used for the first trial, and the
children were given a second opportunity to sort
the objects into a new two-bowled tray (“Here,
you can have another turn.”). When all four
objects were sorted into the bowls, the
experimenter removed them.
Next the experimenter placed the objects from
Set B on the table in a square arrangement such
that the objects with matching sounds were in the
front and back of the square configuration. No
demonstration was provided for the objects of Set
B. The children were simply invited children to
play with them. Once the children placed all four
of the objects into the bowls, the experimenter
gave them another opportunity with an identical
set of objects and bowls. As with the Set-A
objects, each child in Experiment 2 had two
chances to place the Set-B objects into the bowls.
The set of objects presented as Set A was
counterbalanced across subjects as was the sound
that was placed on the right during the
demonstration.
Dependent Measure and Scoring. Children
received a score of 1 if they placed the two objects
that produced the same sound in one bowl and the
two that made the other sound in the other bowl.
Because children were given four such trials (two
of Set A and two of Set B), scores ranged from 0 –
4 for sorts by sound.
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Results and Discussion
When given the opportunity to handle the
objects, almost all of the children (90%) shook all
four objects on at least one of the four trials. The
mean number of objects shaken per trial was 3.20
(SD = 1.16) in the Sorting group, 3.22 (SD = 1.17)
in the Presort + Manipulation control, and 2.53
(SD = 1.41), in the Sound-Only control. A oneway ANOVA showed no significant difference
among groups, F (2, 45) = 1.57, p = .22, hp2 = .07
indicating that the children across the groups
shook and heard the sounds approximately equally
during the response period.
Figure 4 shows the mean number of trials
sorted by sound as a function of experimental
group. A one-way ANOVA yielded a significant
difference in sorting as a function of group, F (2,
45) = 5.49, p = .007, hp2 = .20. Follow-up tests
(SNK) showed that the children in the Sorting
group sorted by sound significantly more often (M
= 2.44, SD = 1.45) than did the children in the
Sound-only control (M = 1.13, SD = .81) or in the
Presort + Manipulation control (M = 1.43, SD =
1.15) groups, and that there was no significant
difference between the two control groups.
Table 3 shows the number of children who
produced sorts based on sound. In the Sorting
group, 38% of the children (6 of 16) sorted by
sound on all four trials, whereas none of the 32
children in the control groups did so, p = .001,
Fisher’s exact test, Cramer’s V = .54. The
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significantly higher level of sorting by sound in
the Sorting group suggests that the children
learned this rule from observing the model. As in
Experiment 1, the children gleaned important
information from observing the rule-governed
sorting behavior itself, and applied it to both Set A
and Set B (hence the sorting on all four trials).
Recall that children in the Sorting group
witnessed the adult sorting the objects by sound
for Set A, but not for Set B. Set B was simply
placed on the table to see what the child would do,
testing for generalization. A 2-way mixed model
ANOVA on the sound-sort scores showed no main
effect difference between Set A and Set B; both
sets had identical sorting scores (M = .83, SD =
.81). There was a significant main effect for Test
Group, as expected, and importantly, no
significant Set(2) x Test Group(3) interaction, F
(2, 45) = 1.22, p = .30, hp2 = .05 (the values for Set
A and B respectively are: Sorting M = 1.38, SD =
.89, M = 1.06, SD = .93; Sound-only control M =
.50, SD = .52, M = .63, SD = .72; Presort +
Manipulation control M = .63, SD = .72, M = .81,
SD = .75). In short, children performed as well in
discriminately sorting the objects as a function of
test group using Set B as they did when using Set
A, suggesting generalization.
General Discussion
The results of this work demonstrate that
children profit from an adult’s demonstration of a
sorting strategy. In both experiments, the children
showed increased sorting by the target dimension
in the Sorting group versus the controls. It is
noteworthy that in the response period, the objects
were placed in a random (Experiment 1) or
predetermined (Experiment 2) arrangement that
was different from the arrangement used during
the model’s demonstration. Thus, to sort along the
modeled dimension the children could not imitate
the particular actions or the strict sequence of

picking up and placing that the adult used. The
children had to abstract the model’s organizational
strategy or sorting rule and apply it to their own
sorting behavior.
What did the children in the Sorting groups of
Experiments 1 and 2 learn from watching the
adult’s demonstration? One possibility is that the
demonstration highlighted that the fact that the
objects had the target properties. That is, the
demonstration may have simply shown children
that the objects varied by color (Experiment 1) or
sound (Experiment 2). However, this attention
explanation taken alone seems unlikely. In
Experiment 1, children in all conditions could see
that the objects varied in color, and in Experiment
2, they were equally likely to shake the objects to
produce the sounds.
A second possibility is that the model’s
demonstration in the Sorting condition primed
children to sort the objects by color or sound. In a
case attributed to priming in the observational
learning literature (Byrne & Russon, 1998), a
learner observes an actor engage in certain
behaviors and receive a reward. This observation
activates the learner’s previously acquired habit or
representation of what can be done with the
elements in that situation, making these
highlighted behaviors more likely to occur in the
learner’s subsequent interactions with the
materials. We think that this process is an unlikely
explanation for our results for several reasons.
First, it is improbable that the children had prior
representations for how to interact with our
stimuli, particularly for the objects we constructed
for Experiment 2: Four identical hats that looked
the same in every respect but nonetheless
produced two different sounds. Second, grouping
the objects by color or sound did not lead to any
explicit, extrinsic reward; the model’s behaviors
did not lead to another end, such as obtaining food
or opening a container to get a sticker. Even the
feedback given to the children during the response
periods was neutral (e.g. “You can have another
turn.”).
Additionally, observing the outcome/endstate
did not lead the children in the control groups to
sort by color or sound (Presort control of
Experiment 1; Presort + Manipulation controls,
Experiments 1 and 2). The fact that the children in
the Presort + Manipulation group in both
experiments showed low levels of sorting by the
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target dimensions is particularly striking. The
modeled behaviors were very similar in this
control group and in the Sorting group. In both
cases, the adult picked up each object and placed it
into the appropriate bowl, which resulted in two
groups that were sorted by the target dimension.
The key difference, however, was that in the
Sorting groups, children saw the adult demonstrate
a particular transformation. That is, she moved the
objects from a mixed pile on the table via an
intentional act of sorting. In the Presort +
Manipulation control, in contrast, she simply
picked them up and returned them to the presorted
configuration in the bowls. The significant
difference in the children’s sorting between these
two groups indicates the key importance of the
model’s demonstration of intentional sorting
behavior for the acquisition of the sorting rule.
A third explanation for our results is that
children interpreted the adult’s demonstration as a
social prompt or request for them to engage in the
same sorting strategy that the adult had used.
Children’s sensitivity to social cues in learning
situations is well documented. Mutual eye gaze
and the use of motherese, and stressed acts may
identify a social or a pedagogical context to
children that prompts them to replicate adult
behavior (e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2006). Although
this social context may have motivated children, it
cannot provide a full account of the effect. The
Presort
+
Manipulation
demonstrations
(Experiments 1 and 2) these same features of a
pedagogical
exchange,
including
direct
instructions to attend to the behaviors (i.e. “It’s my
turn now, watch.”) and overt manipulation of the
target objects; however, the children in these
control groups did not produce the sorted outcome.
Although attention, priming, and social
support/demands may play some role, the
explanation we favor is that children in the Sorting
conditions learned something more fundamental
from watching the model’s demonstration. We
suggest that the children in the Sorting conditions
learned to identify the new organization (e.g.,
objects were sorted by sound-making properties)
and/or how to produce a sort by the target
dimension (e.g., separating exemplars of the same
shape to group them by the invisible kind of
sound). Every object has many characteristics; it is
not always obvious which one is relevant in a
situation (Quine, 1960). Details such as an object’s
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color (a visual feature) and the kind of sound it
makes when shaken (a functional property) can be
indicative of other underlying properties. For
example, the color of a fruit can indicate whether
it is ripe or poisonous, and the sound that an object
makes can indicate its invisible contents or kind
(type of biological species).
A number of experiments, including those
using the dimensional change card sorting task
(e.g., Frye, Zelazo, Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, Carlson,
& Kesek, 2008), show that preschoolers and earlyelementary age children have difficulties
switching between multiple properties for objects
and that performance on early sorting tasks
predicts scores on later general intelligence
measures (Arlin, 1981; Bigler & Liben, 1992). The
results of the current experiments suggest that
observing an adult’s sorting behavior is a direct
and efficient way to instruct children to group
objects by different properties than they would do
spontaneously.1 Such demonstrations may be one
way in which social interaction and the
observations of experts in the culture help shape
children’s categories, which in turn may influence
cognitive development more generally (Meltzoff
et al., in press).
The current research significantly expands
studies of preschoolers’ imitation. In addition to
the reproduction of precise actions and/or
outcomes, our results suggest that children can
also learn a rule or strategy through the
observation of another’s behavior. The children in
our experiments were shown to identify and apply
the same categorization strategy that an adult
demonstrated. Critically, the children’s sorting
behavior depended on observing a model produce
the rule to be replicated. Other physically-similar
demonstrations were not effective for generating
the relevant sorting. The range of control groups
used here is one step towards isolating the
essential
components
of
the
model’s
demonstration and thereby specifying the
cognitive strategies that 36-month-olds can
abstract from observation. We are currently
conducting additional experiments with 18-montholds to examine the development of imitation of
abstract rules (Pinkham, Williamson, Jaswal, &
Meltzoff, 2008). This expansion of research on
childhood imitation to include rules and strategies,
not simply concrete behaviors and endstates,
deepens our understanding of children’s social
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learning processes; it contributes to our
understanding of how the children’s observation of
adults can sculpt human cultural practices,
thinking, and development.
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